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China must tackle its bubble trouble
中國該是處理泡沫問題的時候了
China is experiencing another wave of inflation. From bottled water to bread, prices are surging. The statistics may not fully reflect the situation. Over the past decade, China has transformed from the lowest-priced economy in the world to one of the highest-priced. Nothing symbolises the transformation better than busy customs officials trying to stop travelling Chinese from hauling food items and toilet paper back across the border.
中國正面臨另一輪通脹問題。從瓶裝水到面包，物價在不斷上漲。有關(guān)統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)可能無法完全反映有關(guān)狀況。在過去十年，中國由全球物價最低經(jīng)濟(jì)體轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槲飪r最高經(jīng)濟(jì)體之一。海關(guān)官員正試圖阻止中國游客托運(yùn)食品及廁紙入境這一繁忙景象是對中國經(jīng)濟(jì)體轉(zhuǎn)變的最好證明。
From 1998 to 2003, China experienced deflation following a bout of inflation, driven by overcapacity and a labour surplus. China shifted into inflation in 2004 due to rising commodity prices and the end of the labour surplus.
從1998年至2003年，中國先經(jīng)歷了通貨緊縮，隨后又由于產(chǎn)能過剩及勞動力剩余而出現(xiàn)通貨膨脹。由于商品價格上漲及勞動力不再剩余，中國於2004年陷入通貨膨脹的局面。
But the inflation today is different.
但現(xiàn)今面臨的通貨膨脹有別于以往。
First, overcapacity is still a problem; in fact, it became worse after the 2008 crisis as China's attempt to stimulate the economy vastly increased capacity while a weak global economy kept demand weak. This is why the producer price index has experienced a long period of decline.
首先，產(chǎn)能過剩仍然是個問題；事實(shí)上，在2008年金融危機(jī)后問題變得越發(fā)嚴(yán)重，由于中國試圖刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)能大增，而蕭條的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)大環(huán)境下需求疲弱。此為生產(chǎn)者物價指數(shù)之所以長期下降的原因。
Furthermore, commodity prices are now declining. But despite these reasons, prices are rising because local governments have developed an elaborate machinery to collect money between production and consumption.
另外，商品價格在不斷下降。盡管如此，物價仍在不斷上漲，因為當(dāng)?shù)卣呀?jīng)建立完善機(jī)制在生產(chǎn)和消費(fèi)環(huán)節(jié)征稅。
China's inflation is largely a tax on the household sector to fund the government sector. The main purpose is to extend the investment cycle.
中國的通脹在極大程度上是從家居行業(yè)征稅為政府部門籌資，主要目的為延長投資周期。
In the East Asian export and investment development model, the two go together. When exports slow due to weak demand or competition, investment must slow, too. Otherwise, there would be a big balance of payments deficit, leading to a financial crisis.
在東亞出口與投資發(fā)展模式中，二者并行齊進(jìn)。當(dāng)出口由于需求疲弱或競爭的關(guān)系而放緩時，投資也會放緩。否則將會存在巨大付款赤字結(jié)余，從而引發(fā)金融危機(jī)。
This was what South Korea faced in 1997. China's day of reckoning should have been in 2008. The global financial crisis exposed the weakness of credit-fuelled Western demand for Chinese goods. But, instead of slowing investment to match the slower exports, China accelerated investment with its stimulus to maintain the GDP growth rate.
這就是韓國在1997年面臨的狀況。中國在2008年也出現(xiàn)過類似的情況。全球金融危機(jī)導(dǎo)致以信貸為主的西方國家對中國產(chǎn)品的需求疲弱。但是，中國非但沒有減緩?fù)顿Y以適應(yīng)放緩的出口，反而加速投資刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)以期維持其GDP的增長速度。
Investment rose to about 50 per cent of gross domestic product, 10 percentage points higher than in 2008. Rising local government debt and inflation funded the investment surge. As the local government debt becomes difficult to increase, the funding burden is increasingly shifting to inflation. The latest bout of inflation should be understood in this context.
中國的投資已占到國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的近50%，較2008年高出10個百分點(diǎn)。不斷增長的當(dāng)?shù)卣畟鶆?wù)及通貨膨脹為投資浪潮提供資金。由于當(dāng)?shù)卣y以舉借新債，融資重?fù)?dān)逐漸轉(zhuǎn)向通脹。最近一輪的通脹可按此理解。
Japan and Korea saw their investment rise above 40 per cent of GDP briefly. China's investment has been above that level for over a decade. The simple maths is that a higher ratio for investment means a lower ratio for consumption. But the former leads to more capacity. With consumption held down, exports could absorb the capacity. But as the global economy remains sluggish, there is no demand other than investment itself to absorb the capacity. China's growth model has become a capacity bubble. To absorb excess capacity, China creates investment demand that leads to even more overcapacity.
日本和韓國的投資比例曾在短時間內(nèi)超過國民生產(chǎn)總值的40%。中國投資所占比例超過該水平已有十余年。從簡單的數(shù)學(xué)理論而言，投資比率越高，則消費(fèi)比率越低。但前者可產(chǎn)生更多產(chǎn)能，在消費(fèi)水平持續(xù)下降的情況下，出口可以吸收該等產(chǎn)能。但由于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)仍不景氣，除投資本身吸收該等產(chǎn)能外，并無其他需求。中國的增長模式已成為一個產(chǎn)能泡沫。為吸收過剩產(chǎn)能，中國創(chuàng)造投資需求，從而導(dǎo)致更多過剩產(chǎn)能。
Bread costs more in China than in most places. But China's five-star hotels offer some of the lowest rates in the world. The contrast reflects China's growth model: taxing the household sector through inflation to fund investment. Necessities like foodstuffs and toilet paper can be taxed more than five-star hotels.
中國的面包比大多數(shù)國家都賣得貴。但中國部分五星級酒店提供全球最低價格的房間。此項對比反映中國的增長模式：通過通脹向家居行業(yè)征稅為投資融資。食物及廁紙之類的必需品課稅比五星級酒店更重。
China's inflation dynamic reflects the government's monopoly power in maximising prices. The money supply defines the limits of inflation. For example, China's money supply is rising at about 15 per cent this year. The real growth rate is, at best, half as much. The difference is probably absorbed by inflation.
中國的通脹動態(tài)反映出政府在制定價格方面的壟斷權(quán)力。貨幣供應(yīng)決定通脹的限度。例如，今年中國的貨幣供應(yīng)上升近15%。真正的增長比率最多為一半。差額可能被通脹吸收。
Inflation, not growth, is the destabilising force in China. The current high rate of inflation could trigger a vicious wage-price spiral, as China is facing a labour shortage. The spiral would make the exchange rate policy unsustainable.
通脹并非增長率，是使中國最不穩(wěn)定的因素。由于中國正面臨勞動力短缺的問題，現(xiàn)下的高通脹比率將引發(fā)工資與物價嚴(yán)重的螺旋式上升。工資與物價的螺旋式上升將導(dǎo)致匯率政策的不穩(wěn)定。
China's financial stability depends on expectations of a stable or rising renminbi against the dollar. If inflation leads to expectations of a devaluation, a financial collapse is likely. Hence, China has to slow growth of the money supply.
中國的財政穩(wěn)定性依賴人民幣兌美元的穩(wěn)定或增長預(yù)期。若通脹導(dǎo)致貨幣貶值預(yù)期，財政則很可能會崩潰。因此。中國必須減緩貨幣供應(yīng)的增長速度。
Japan experienced a price bubble two decades ago; South Korea and Southeast Asia, 15 years ago. The bubble deflated in Japan after a long period of deflation, while a "maxi-devaluation", a large reduction in the currency's value over a period of time, followed in Southeast Asia and Korea. China's adjustment would be similar to Japan's. The more inflation China has now, the more deflation later.
在二十年前，日本經(jīng)歷了一場價格泡沫；韓國及東南亞在十五年前也經(jīng)歷過價格泡沫。日本經(jīng)濟(jì)的泡沫在經(jīng)歷一段較長時間的通貨緊縮后才破滅，隨后東南亞和韓國迎來的是一段“長時間的貨幣貶值”，在一段時間內(nèi)貨幣的價值出現(xiàn)大幅度縮減。中國的調(diào)整將與日本相似。中國當(dāng)前的通貨膨脹越高，日后通貨緊縮越嚴(yán)重。
Local governments have been trying everything to raise financing to sustain existing investment projects. But, banks are pushing risky loans off their books to the shadow banking system. Local government funding costs are rising as a result. With rising interest rates, China's investment bubble will burst, probably in a matter of months, not years.
當(dāng)?shù)卣褔L盡各種籌資方法以維持現(xiàn)有的投資項目。然而，各大銀行正將其賬上的風(fēng)險性貸款撥至影子銀行系統(tǒng)。當(dāng)?shù)卣娜谫Y費(fèi)用因此上升。隨著利率增長，中國的投資泡沫將會破滅，或許就是幾個月的事，而不用再等幾年。
If China sticks to a stable exchange rate policy, which I expect, prices will go down. China suffered high prices in the early 1990s. By sticking to a stable exchange rate policy, it took five years of deflation to make China cheap again. In this current period of inflation, prices are more out of line with international levels. The coming bout of deflation needs to be severe enough to correct the misalignment.
如果中國堅持穩(wěn)定的匯率政策，我預(yù)期物價將會下降。中國在二十世紀(jì)九十年代初期曾經(jīng)歷物價高漲，但通過堅持穩(wěn)定的匯率政策，經(jīng)過五年的通貨緊縮，中國物價恢復(fù)正常。在現(xiàn)下的通脹時期，物價水平已遠(yuǎn)超國際水平。要想扭轉(zhuǎn)物價高企的現(xiàn)狀，則將迎來一輪極其嚴(yán)重的通貨緊縮。
Unlike Japan, China can expect another growth cycle. The current level of household consumption is one-tenth of the level in advanced economies. It is logical, therefore, for China to shift income away from government to households to support consumption, which would gradually absorb the overcapacity.
與日本不同的是，中國可迎來另一輪增長周期。中國當(dāng)前的家居消費(fèi)水平為發(fā)達(dá)國家的十分之一。因此，中國將政府收入轉(zhuǎn)移至家居行業(yè)以支持消費(fèi)是合理的，此舉將會逐步吸收過剩的產(chǎn)能。
The collapse of the land bubble is a necessary part of the adjustment. It will decrease government revenue and increase the purchasing power of household income.
土地泡沫的破滅為調(diào)整的必要部分。土地泡沫破滅將會降低政府收入及增強(qiáng)家庭收入的購買力。
When the property bubble crashes in China, it will be a new beginning, not the end, of China's growth. The US experienced the 1930s before its rise to become the world's dominant economy. The same thing will probably happen to China.
中國房地產(chǎn)泡沫的破碎將會是中國增長的新開端，而非中國增長的結(jié)束。美國經(jīng)歷了二十世紀(jì)三十年代艱難時期后才成為全球主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)體。同樣事情也可能會發(fā)生在中國。
